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Abstract 
This paper presents a simple model that incorporates two types of sovereign default 
cost: first, a lump-sum cost due to the fact that the country does not service its debt 
fully and is recognised as being in default status, by ratings agencies, for example. 
Second,  a  cost  that  increases  with  the  size  of  the  losses  (or  haircut)  imposed  on 
creditors whose resistance to a haircut increases with the proportional loss inflicted 
upon them.  
One  immediate  implication  of  the  model  is  that  under  some  circumstances  the 
creditors have a (collective) interest to forgive some debt in order to induce the country 
not to default. 
The model exhibits a potential for multiple equilibria, given that a higher interest rate 
charged  by  investors  increases  the  debt  service  burden  and  thus  the  temptation  to 
default. Under very high debt levels, credit rationing can set in as the feedback loop 
between higher interest rates and the higher incentive to default can become explosive. 
The introduction of uncertainty makes multiple equilibria less likely and reduces their 
range.  
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Introduction 
It is now a commonplace to argue that a high level of public debt leads to indeterminacy for 
risk  premia  because  even  a  rather  high  level  of  public  debt  could  be  sustainable  if  the 
government  only had  to  pay  the  low  interest  rate  corresponding  to  riskless  investments. 
However,  the  same  level  of  debt  might  become  unsustainable,  forcing  a  default,  if  the 
interest rate on public debt were much higher. Many authors have therefore argued that 
there might be multiple equilibria: if the market thinks the government can pay, it will be 
able to pay because the risk premium will be low. However, if the market thinks that the 
government cannot pay, it will not be able to pay, because the risk premium will be so high 
that debt service becomes too expensive for the government to finance. Doubts about the 
ability of a government to service its debt could thus become self-fulfilling. Kopf (2011) and 
de Grauwe (2011) have argued that within the euro area all national governments are in this 
situation and that a crisis could arise when the market just switches from the good (low 
interest rate) to the bad equilibrium (high interest rates), thus forcing a default. 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  present  an  analytical  framework  for  this  issue.  The 
framework describes the problem facing a country that cannot print the currency in which its 
debt is denominated. This is the case for the euro area countries today and has been the case 
for the foreign debt of emerging market economies. 
The  model  presented  here  is  thus  different  in  nature  from  the  literature  on  speculative 
attacks on highly indebted countries, which looks at the trade-off between using the printing 
press or taxes to service high levels of public debt (see Obstfeld, 1995 and Adrian & Gros, 
1999,  for  example).  When  the  government  cannot  print  the  currency  in  which  its  debt  is 
denominated, it has only the choice of increasing taxes or defaulting. 
This choice between an increase in taxes or default is implicit in most of the literature on 
defaults  and  debt  crisis  that  was  motivated  by  the  experience  of  the  1980s,  when  many 
emerging  economies  had  problems  servicing  their  (mostly  foreign)  debt.  A  common 
assumption  in  that  literature,  however,  is  that  in  some  states  there  are  simply  too  few 
resources for a country to service its debt and that in the case of default it just delivers to 
foreign creditors whatever foreign exchange earnings it has. A key feature of this paper is 
that the choice of how much to pay to creditors is a more gradual one, based on the cost of 
raising the necessary revenues and the cost these creditors can impose on the debtor country.  
The key feature of the model presented is thus that the decision to default involves costs that 
have two quite different components:  
i)  First, there is a threshold effect. The very fact that a government does not pay its debt 
fully and on time creates a ‘credit event’ which has serious costs for the government in 
terms of future market access, and usually also damages the market access for banks 
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ii)  Second,  once  the  threshold  has  been  passed,  there  is  still  a  trade-off  between  the 
amount the government is willing to pay and the taxes it has to raise to pay for this 
residual  amount.  Most  defaults  are  followed  by  protracted  negotiations  between 
creditors and the government in which the creditors try to impose higher costs on the 
government if it pays less. 
Section 1 outlines the basic set-up. Section 2 then analyses the feedback loop between interest 
setting and the incentive to default under certainty, i.e. when investors know exactly the 
circumstances under which a higher interest rate will increase the debt service burden to the 
point where the government will decide to default, thus validating the high interest rate set 
by  the market.  Section  3  introduces  uncertainty  and  shows  that  the  parameter  range  for 
which multiple equilibria are possible is reduced if the decision rule concerning default is 
not fully deterministic. Under uncertainty, the positive feedback loop between debt service 
burden and default is not certain and hence not so strong. Section 4 illustrates one special 
case  for  which  uncertainty  can  eliminate  the  potential  for  multiple  equilibria.  Section  5 
concludes.  
1.  The model 
This model describes the problem facing a government that has to decide during the present, 
final period whether or not to service its debt in full. At this point the debt level is simply 
inherited from the past.  
The starting point is a conventional loss function, which expresses the idea that increasing 
tax revenues leads to increasing distortions and that these distortions become more costly as 
the  tax  rate  increases.  The  social  loss  arising  from  obtaining  tax  revenues  measured  as  a 
percentage of GDP is thus assumed to be given by: 
(1)    =     α>0 
where q indicates the ratio of tax revenues to GDP, or the overall effective tax rate, and the 
parameter α  measures  the  inefficiency  of  the  tax  system,  a higher  value  implies  a  lower 
efficiency. 
If the government chooses to default it also has to deal with the opposition of its creditors, 
which will be stronger the higher the haircut imposed on them and the larger the debt on 
which this haircut is imposed. The cost of default thus has two components: a lump sum 
once this option has been chosen and then a variable cost which increases with the size of the 
total losses imposed on creditors. 
This is captured by extending the social loss function in the following way: 
(2)     =∝    +  ℎ  +	    
Where Ld now represents the total social loss if the government has chosen to default. 
This social cost has three components:  
i)  There is the lump-sum cost of entering into the default mode (credit rating agencies 
putting the rating of the country on ‘default’), which in general occurs immediately if 
the country does service all of its public debt (denoted by d) in full and on time. This 
lump-sum cost is denoted by LLd (>0). 
ii)  Choosing  the  default  option  does  not  mean  that  nothing  is  paid  on  debt.  On  the 
contrary, the government still has to decide what fraction to pay, or equivalently, what 
‘haircut’, denoted by h, to impose on creditors. The resistance from creditors will be A SIMPLE MODEL OF MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND DEFAULT | 3 
 
stronger  the greater their  total  losses.  This  resistance  should  be  proportional  to  the 
amount  of  debt,  denoted  by  d,  on  which  the  haircut  applies;  a  higher  haircut  will 
encounter increasing resistance. 
iii)  Finally there is still the cost of raising revenues from taxes to pay for the residual debt 
service, which create distortions and thus social costs, αq2. 
Lower  case  d  thus  represents  the  debt-to-GDP  ratio  and  h  is  the  ‘haircut’  imposed  on 
creditors.  This  notation  implies  that  the  proportion  of  the  total  debt  the  government  is 
willing to pay (if it has chosen the default option) would be (1-h). Creditors will of course 
resist any haircut and try to inflict costs on the government (e.g. law suits, attachment of 
assets,  etc.)  and  their  resistance should  be stronger  the  larger  the  cut  they  have  to  take. 
Moreover, the political cost in terms of pressure from the governments of creditors’ home 
countries is likely to increase the larger the haircut.  
The parameter α represents the cost arising from higher taxes relative to the intensity of the 
costs the creditors can impose on a government that wants to impose a haircut on them. 
If government debt is owed to foreign residents the parameter α should be higher because 
the  political  cost  of  taxing  voters  to  transfer  resources  to  foreigners  will  certainly  be 
perceived to be higher than if the government has to levy taxes whose proceeds are paid out 
to other residents, and thus voters. 
The loss function specified in equation (2) implies that there is a trade-off between increasing 
the ‘haircut’ imposed on creditors and increasing taxes to service the debt. As this paper 
concentrates  on  the  choice  between  taxation  and  debt  service  all  other  expenditure  is 
neglected and it is assumed that taxes need only to be raised to pay off the existing debt, d. 
This  implies  immediately  that  the  economy-wide  tax  rate  (or  equivalently  the  primary 
surplus) required to pay off its debt in full is equal to the debt (or rather the debt-to-GDP 
ratio): q = d. It follows that if debt is serviced in full the social loss is given simply by: 
(3)     =     
If the government chooses the default option it still has to make a decision as it has to decide 
on the size of the haircut. This is in reality an important decision since no country (except in 
extreme circumstances, like war) has just declared a default and then paid nothing. In reality 
the declaration (or rather admission) of a government that it is not able to pay its creditors in 
full  is  usually  followed  by  a  period  of  negotiation  over  the  proportion  of  its  debt  the 
government feels able to pay.  
A key consideration in this context is that the tax rate necessary after a default is determined 
by the size of the haircut since the remaining debt obligation will amount to (1-h)d. This 
implies that the social loss in case of default is determined by the solution to the problem: 
(4)  	min     =  ((1 − ℎ) )  +  ℎ  +	    
This implies that the size of the haircut, h, which minimises the social loss, will be given by: 
(5)  – 2(1 − ℎ)   + 2 ℎ = 0 => ℎ =
∝ 
(  ∝ )	< 1 
The haircut as a fraction of the value of debt thus depends on the level of debt to be serviced 
and  the  cost  of  raising  tax  revenue  (relative  to  the  costs  the  creditors  can  inflict  on  the 
government). The higher this cost, i.e. the higher α, the more attractive it becomes for the 
government to reduce the need to have high taxes to service the debt, which implies that a 4 |  DANIEL GROS 
 
higher haircut becomes more attractive. A higher level of debt also makes a higher haircut 
desirable, as one would expect. 
The solution for the haircut can be substituted back into the loss function to calculate the loss 
under default: 
(6)     =      1 −
∝ 
(  ∝ ) 
 
+    
∝ 
(  ∝ ) 
 
+	    
which can be simplified to: 
(7)     =    (1 +   )   +	    
The difference between the loss under full debt service and the loss under default is thus 
given by (see equations (3) and (7)): 
(8)     −    =     −    (1 +   )   −	    =     (1 +   )   −	    
The first part of this difference (α2 d3/(1+αd)) is always positive because imposing a haircut 
on creditors allows the government to reduce costly taxes by operating on another margin 
(defaulting on its creditors). This part might be called the ‘temptation’ because it represents 
the gain in terms of lower welfare costs the government could accrue through a default. 
The temptation has to be set against the lump-sum cost of defaulting. The entire expression 
on the right-hand side of equation (8) could of course be negative if the lump-sum cost of 
defaulting  is  high  enough.  In  this  case  default  would  not  be  a  rational  option.  But  the 
opposite is also true: if the loss from servicing debt in full is larger than under default it 
would be rational for the government to default. Condition (8) thus defines implicitly the 
threshold for the debt level (given the lump-sum cost of defaulting and the relative cost of 
raising tax revenues) at which the government will just be induced to default.  A country 
with a debt level above the threshold defined by condition (8) could be said to have a debt 
overhang. 
Inspection of condition (8) shows that the maximum debt the country is willing to service 
fully is negatively related to the parameter α.  This is what intuition would suggest: the 
higher the cost of raising tax revenues, the lower the debt carrying capacity of the country. 
A first result of this simple setup concerns the relationship between the level of debt and 
what the government will actually pay, which should determine the market value of its debt. 
In  models  without  specific  costs  of  default  the  market  value  of  the  debt  of  the  country 
increases  one-to-one  with the  nominal  value  of the  debt. It  is  then  simply  capped  at  the 
ceiling determined by the exogenously given debt service capacity of the country. In this set-
up, however, the value of debt will increase with the level of debt up to the limit given by 
equation (8) which describes the default threshold.  
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Figure 1. How much will be paid? 
 
Note: The two lines are based on α=0.5 and LLd (=0.1) such that default occurs when d=0.9.  
Figure 1 shows that to the right of the point determined by the condition that the social loss 
under default is equal to the loss under no default, the value of the debt jumps downwards, 
because with a slightly higher debt the government will prefer to default and impose the 
haircut determined by equation (5) and the government will pay out only 
(9)  (1 − ℎ)  =
 
(  ∝ )  <   
The relationship between the debt level and what the government would be willing to pay 
(under default) is not linear because a higher debt level leads to a higher haircut. Equation 
(9) implies that the maximum the government would be willing to pay (as a proportion of 
GDP) as the debt level goes to infinity is equal to 1/α. 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the level of debt (on the horizontal axis) and what 
the government will actually pay (vertical axis) for a parameter constellation (α=0.5), and a 
level  of  the  lump-sum  cost  of  default,  which  implies  that  the  threshold  at  which  the 
government will default is equal to 85% of GDP. 
One  immediate  implication  is  that the  creditors  have  an  interest  in  unilaterally  forgiving 
some debt if the debt is just above the threshold that will trigger a default. Krugman (1988) 
also  arrives  at  the  conclusion  that  above  certain  levels  of  debt  it  might  make  sense  for 
creditors (if they can act collectively) to unilaterally forgive some debt. In Krugman (1988) 
his result requires a ‘Laffer curve’ for tax revenues, whereas in the model presented here the 
result comes about because of the lump-sum cost of default. 
The existence of default costs thus generates a collective action problem: if the debt level is 
somewhat  above  the  level  at  which  it  would  be  rational  for  the  country  to  default,  the 
collective interests of all creditors would be served best by forgiving just enough debt to 
0.05
0.15
0.25
0.35
0.45
0.55
0.65
0.75
0.85
0.95
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95 1.05 1.15 1.25 1.35 1.45 1.55 1.65 1.75
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
d
e
b
t
 
(
r
a
t
i
o
 
t
o
 
G
D
P
)
Debt (ratio to GDP)
With default Without default
Creditorshave an interest 
in 'PSI', i.e. reducing the 
face value of debt
PSI not 
interesting
for creditors
Nodefault: 
market value 
= face value6 |  DANIEL GROS 
 
bring the country back to a situation where ‘default does not pay’. However, each individual 
creditor would of course like to have his individual claim served in full.1 
The  case  of  Greece,  which  agreed  on  a ‘voluntary’  reduction  of  its  debt  with  its private 
creditors  under  a  complex  operation  called  officially  ‘Private  Sector Involvement’  or  PSI, 
could be understood in this way. Through the PSI operation, which was implemented in 
early 2012, Greece avoided a full-scale default; and maybe its private creditors did receive 
more than they would have received if Greece had gone into a formal default. 
However, debt forgiveness does not make sense above a certain threshold level of debt. As 
one can see also from Figure 1, at very high levels of debt, creditors would be better off if the 
country goes into default: even with a ‘haircut’, they would receive more than the maximum 
amount the country would be willing to pay in order to avoid default. This will be the case 
for debt levels higher than the upper limit of the middle panel of Figure 1. The upper limit of 
this region can be determined from the condition that the payout to creditors is equal to the 
maximum debt level at which default is still not chosen.  Designing the latter as dd and the 
former as dno PSI, condition (9) yields: 
(10) 
   	   
(  ∝   	   ) ≥    
The maximum proportional haircut that would be in the (collective) interests of creditors is 
thus given by:  
(11) 
   	      
   	   
=     
The haircut that makes creditors indifferent between agreeing to a collective debt reduction 
or seeing the country go into default is thus given by the product of the cost of raising tax 
revenues (α) and the debt level that is just sustainable without default (which is a function of 
the same parameter and the lump-sum cost of default). 
This  completes  the  description  of  the  final period  during  which  what  is  left  to  decide  is 
whether to service its debt in full and what the size of the haircut will be if default is chosen.  
The key question is of course how a situation with a debt overhang could arise. Why would 
investors  lend  the  government more  money  than  it  would  choose  to  repay?  One  answer 
could be that the total amount of debt was not publicly known, as in the case of Greece. 
Another possibility is that new information emerges about the capacity of the country to 
collect revenues (again, one could interpret the Greek experience in this way). But another 
possibility is that the final-period debt level is too high because interest rates were fixed at a 
high level during the previous period.  This mechanism is explored in the next section. 
2.  Interest  rate setting and multiple equilibria 
The decisive action takes place during the previous period, during which the debt level to be 
serviced in the final period is determined by the interaction between the debt level inherited 
from an earlier period and the interest rate set in financial markets. Abstracting again from 
primary expenditure, the debt level to be serviced in the final period is determined by the 
debt  level  at  the  beginning  of  the  previous  period  and  the  interest  rate  on  public  debt 
determined during this period: 
                                                   
1 An extension that is not pursued here is to consider the interests of the country, which would of 
course  benefit  from  a  larger  debt  forgiveness  and  could  thus  threaten  to  default  strategically. 
Analyzing such a set-up would require the application of the tools of game theory (see also Tirole, 
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(12)  	  = (1 +  )    
Where d -1 denotes the debt level of the previous, starting, period and i denotes the interest 
rate set in the market.  
The setting of this interest rate is a key aspect of the model because this is what gives rise to 
the potential for multiple equilibria. Investors are aware that the government could default 
in the final period and that they might be subject to a haircut. In this section it is assumed 
that the decision rule of the government is simply to calculate the difference between the 
social loss under default and full payment and then to implement whatever gives rise to a 
lower social loss. 
The market for government debt is determined by a simple arbitrage condition. Investors 
have an alternative investment in the form of a riskless asset, yielding the rate ρ. 
This implies that investors would be willing to buy the debt of the government in question at 
this riskless rate if, and only if, they assume that there will be no default. If a default is 
expected, the interest rate must of course be higher to compensate for the haircut investors 
can expect (with certainty). 
The model can best be solved backwards by first analysing the case in which no default is 
expected. 
Conditions for no default equilibrium 
In this case the (expected) haircut is zero and the interest rate is given by: 
(13)  1 +   = 1 +   
This can be an equilibrium if under this interest rate default ‘does not pay’, i.e. if the social 
loss from default is indeed larger than under full payment. Using the values for the final 
period debt level given by (10) and (11) in expression (8) for the difference between the loss 
between default and no default yields:  
(14)     −    =       (1 +  ) 
 
(1 +    (1 +  ) )   −	    < 0 
To simplify the notation the variable d-1 (1+ρ) will henceforth denoted be by D: 
(15)    ≡    (1 +  ) 
The variable D could be called the ‘risk-free debt’ since this is the debt level the country 
would have in the final period if it could finance its debt at the risk-free rate. Since this 
parameter is the product of the inherited debt level and the risk-free interest rate (or the 
alternative rate of return accepted by investors), it follows that a shock to global interest rates 
could have the same effect within this model as a higher debt level. 
The condition for full debt service to be the rational option can thus be written as: 
(16)     −    =     (1 +   )   −	    < 0 
 or 
(17)  [1 +   ]       <	    
The left-hand side of this equation shows the gain from defaulting, the right-hand side the 
lump-sum  cost  of  doing  so.  Full  debt  service  becomes  a  self-fulfilling  prophecy  if  the 8 |  DANIEL GROS 
 
combination of the initial debt level (increased for the riskless interest rate) and the cost of 
extracting  taxes  from  the  economy  (α),  is  low  enough  to  be  smaller  than  the  threshold 
determined by the lump-sum cost of default. Full debt service is never rational if this lump-
sum cost is zero. However, the converse also holds: if this lump-sum cost is positive, full 
debt service is rational if the debt and/or the cost of taxation is low enough. 
Conditions for default equilibrium 
If investors expect a default, the domestic interest rate must be given by the riskless rate plus 
a term that reflects the fact that under default creditors get paid only a fraction (1-h) on every 
unit they are due: 
(18)  1 +   = (1 +  )(1 − ℎ) 
This can be rewritten more conveniently in terms of the ‘risk premium’, i.e. the differential 
between the riskless rate and the rate actually paid by the government. Strictly speaking 
there  is  no  risk  when  there  is  no  uncertainty.  Under  certainty  one  should  thus  call  it  a 
‘default’ premium. This difference between the default and no-default interest rate can be 
defined as: 
(19)    ≡
   
    
The market equilibrium interest rate under default can then be written as: 
(20)    = (1 − ℎ)   
Given that the optimal choice of h, given default, is equal to αd/(1+αd) (see equation (5)) this 
implies that in this case the risk premium would be given by: 
(21)    =  1 +           
where the final period debt level, if default is expected, is denoted by ddefexp. This final period 
debt level is of course influenced by the interest rate set in the market and thus the risk 
premium. Given the definition of D this can be written as: 
(22)    = (1 +    ) 
which implies that the risk premium becomes a function of the cost of obtaining tax revenues 
and the ‘risk-free’ debt level:  
(23)    = (1 −   )   
Equation (18) can be used to show that in this case (default expected) the haircut would be 
equal to: 
(24)  ℎ =    
It  is  apparent  that  the  last  two  equations  are  defined  only  over  the  range  0≤αD<1.  A 
combination of too high a debt level with high costs of levying taxes would lead to interest 
rates going to infinity (the haircut going to unity) as the product αD approaches 1. When this 
borderline case is reached, the country would experience credit rationing in the sense that it 
would not be able to obtain financing under any conditions (always under the condition that 
a default is expected ex ante).  A SIMPLE MODEL OF MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND DEFAULT | 9 
 
This implies that a country might not be able to obtain financing at any rate if some news 
about either α or D emerges. For example, a sudden increase in global interest rates might 
increase D or news about disappointing tax revenues might increase the perceived value of 
α. 
However, provided the condition (0≤αD<1) is met, the country might still obtain financing 
even if default is expected. The expectation of default can constitute an equilibrium if, with 
the interest rate fixed in the expectation of default, the government would indeed choose to 
default, i.e. if the social loss from paying in full is larger than the loss from default: 
(25)     (  ) [1 +    ]   >	    
This can be simplified to: 
(26)    
  
(    ) 
 
>	    
Inspection  of  inequality  (26)  also  shows  immediately  that  the  condition  for  a  default 
equilibrium to be ex-post validated cannot be satisfied if there is no debt (i.e. if d-1 or D= 0). 
In this case there can be no feedback between higher interest rates and a higher final period 
debt level. The same also holds if the cost of raising tax revenues goes to zero. Economically 
this means that the final period debt might be high, but if it can be financed without a large 
social loss the temptation to default will remain low. This is what one observes in reality. 
Countries with low debt or a high ratio of tax revenues to GDP, which generally indicates 
low collection costs, enjoy lower interest rates.  
In  a  model  without  uncertainty,  it  makes  no  sense  to  speak  of  a  risk  premium,  but  the 
difference between the riskless interest rate and the higher rate often paid by countries with 
high debt levels is called a risk premium. The next section will show how in a model with 
uncertainty the risk premium could be a smooth function of debt levels and other parameters 
of the model. 
Multiple equilibria 
Comparing conditions (17) and (26) shows immediately that they overlap given that the left-
hand side of condition (17) is clearly smaller than the left-hand side of condition (26). There 
is  a  region  for  the  lump-sum  cost  of  default  to  be  high  enough  for  full  debt  service 
equilibrium to be chosen if the interest rate is low, but at the same time not high enough to 
make a default unattractive if the interest rate set in the market has been set in anticipation of 
default. 
(27)    
  
(    ) 
 
>	    >  
    
(    ) 
It follows that within the region defined by the two inequalities in (25) both equilibria are 
possible: default and no default. Which equilibrium materialises cannot be determined in 
this model. Outside this region only one equilibrium is possible: if the lump-sum cost is 
higher than the left-hand expression of the condition (25) (or alternatively with very low debt 
and  collection  costs),  the  default  risk  is  zero  because  in  this  case  full  repayment  would 
always be chosen even if the market had expected default and the debt of the country is 
really ‘risk-free’ in the sense that the only possible equilibrium is that the rate of interest is 
low and the country services its debt in full.  10 |  DANIEL GROS 
 
Conversely, if the cost of default is lower than the right-hand side of expression in condition 
(27) (alternatively if the debt level is very high), the only consistent equilibrium is the one 
with default (and the high risk premium is justified).  
Figure 2. Multiple equilibria under certainty 
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The  region  where  default  could  occur,  but  where  no  default  is  also  an  equilibrium  is 
illustrated in Figure 2 for increasing values of the debt-to-GDP ratio evaluated at the risk-free 
rate, D.  
It  is  apparent  from  (27)  that  a  higher  debt  level  increases  the  lump-sum  cost  of  default 
required  to  make  default  unattractive.  For  example,  one  could  argue  that  for  member 
countries of the euro area the lump-sum cost of defaulting is higher in political terms and 
possibly  also  in  economic  terms  because  of  the  higher  degree  of  economic  and  political 
integration, thus making the no-default equilibrium more likely. This argument was used 
during the 1990s during the drive towards EMU, as it appeared at the time that the much 
higher degree of commitment implicit in EMU membership would lower risk premia. 
The equations also show that a higher cost of raising taxes, i.e. a higher value of α, will have 
the same effect as a higher debt level, making, ceteris paribus, a default more likely.   
It is also apparent that if the lump-sum cost of defaulting were zero, the country would 
always default (provided D is positive) since it would always gain at least a small advantage 
from  hair-cutting  creditors.  This  might  explain  why  the  debt  of  countries  that  just  went 
through a default trades at high-risk premia: the lump-sum cost of a second default in a short 
time is presumably much lower than that of the first one.  A second default is difficult to 
exclude unless debt has been cut to a very low level. 
The width of the region inside which both equilibria are possible is determined by the lump-
sum loss of defaulting (LLd) and the cost of raising tax revenues. Formally it is given by the 
difference between the upper and lower limit in the inequalities (27):  
D   
Equilibrium without default possible 
	  
  
(1 −   )
 
 
>	    
 
Both equilibria possible, 
r =1 or r=1/(1-αD) 
[(1 +   )]       <	    
 
Default equilibrium possible 
No default: low-risk 
premium, r=1 
Default, high- 
risk premium, 
r= equation (1) 
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The region for the debt level in which both equilibria are possible becomes wider the higher 
the debt level (in a highly non-linear way) and the higher the cost of collecting taxes. As 
mentioned above, credit-rationing sets in when the product αD exceeds unity.  
From a policy perspective the key question is whether there is a case for avoiding the higher 
risk premia which lead to the ‘default equilibrium’. Investors expect the same return under 
both equilibria; otherwise interest rates would move. This implies that ex ante they should be 
indifferent on this account.   
However, for the country concerned welfare is clearly lower under the default equilibrium 
because of the social cost of default.  Payments to creditors are the same in both cases (again 
because this is necessary to make investors buy the bonds of the country). The cost of default 
is thus the net cost for the country of a higher risk premium.    
Applied to the euro crisis these results imply that the debtor countries would benefit from 
any mechanism that limits risk premia on their public debt. The simple set-up of this model 
does not permit one to analyse the interests of other actors (see Tirole, 2012) in the interplay 
between interest of creditor and debtor countries).  However, it is clear that a country that 
perceives the potential for multiple equilibria should be willing to make some side payment 
to  induce  others  to  create  some mechanism  to keep  the  risk premium  to  the  ‘no-default’ 
equilibrium.   
In a set-up without uncertainty the ‘no default’ equilibrium actually implies that the country 
has to pay only the risk-free interest rate. This is of course an extreme case, since in reality it 
is never certain that a country will be able to fully service its debt (and, conversely it is also 
rarely certain that a country will default). The next section therefore enriches the model in 
this direction. 
3.  Uncertainty 
With a binary decision rule for the government there is no uncertainty once the interest rate 
has been set. However, in reality this is not the case. Even once the interest rate has been set, 
much uncertainty persists. Even if the final period debt to be serviced can then be calculated 
rather precisely, nobody can be certain about whether there will be a default or not.  
One key reason for this is that the time period considered here is one of several years, with 
the final period encompassing the entire future. Many things could happen between the time 
the  interest  rate  is  set  and  the  time  the  decision  on  default  is  taken.  One  particularly 
important aspect is the political process. In reality at least one, but possibly several elections 
are likely to be held between the current period (in which interest rates are set in the market) 
and the final period (when the government decides whether to default and what haircut to 
impose  on  creditors).  Different  parties  will  compete  and  might  have  different  views  on 
default. Some of them might oppose default on non-economic grounds, or because they have 
a different view of the lump-sum cost of defaulting.  
It is thus not enough for the loss under full debt service to exceed the loss under default to 
always trigger a decision to default.  
When investors consider the price at which to buy the bonds of the government in question 
they  all  know  that  under  certain  conditions  default  is  a  possible  outcome.  Denoting  the 
probability that the government might default with π, the setting of the interest rate will be 
determined by the expected return, which in turn is given by two elements: 12 |  DANIEL GROS 
 
  With probability (1-π) the government does not default. In this case the investor gets 
the full return (1+i).  
  If the government does opt for default (with associated probability π) the investor gets 
only (1-h)(1+i).  
The interest rate accepted by risk-neutral investors who have an alternative rate of return 
equal to the riskless rate   will thus be given by:  
(29)  1 +   = (1 −  )(1 +  ) +  (1 +  )(1 − ℎ) 
or 
(30)  1 +   = (1 +  )/(1 −  ℎ) 
A consistent solution to the model requires of course that the probability of default assumed 
by investors is equal to the one that will result given the level of debt in the final period, 
which in turn is determined by the interest rate set in the previous period.  
The equilibrium condition (29) can be rewritten in terms of the risk premium, r. Keeping in 
mind that the haircut is also a function of r – equations (5) and (14) – this yields: 
(31)    =
 
    
   
      
 
As the probability can only vary between 0 and 1, this implies that the risk premium can 
vary only between 1 (equal to the no ‘default with certainty’ equilibrium discussed above) 
and (1+αDr), which is equivalent to the ‘default is certain’ equilibrium found above. 
The key issue is what factors influence the probability as perceived by investors that the 
default option will be chosen. 
In reality the decision to default will be determined in a complex political process in which 
many  factors  interact,  including  external  pressure  and  perceptions  of  how  a  default  will 
impact the future capital market access of the country. The interplay of all these factors is 
difficult to disentangle ex ante; however, it is likely that the party(ies) that favour(s) default 
will have a greater chance of winning out in the political process the larger the difference 
between the welfare loss under default and the welfare loss under full debt service. A bigger 
difference in the loss should thus make default more likely.  
It was established above that a higher risk premium increases the debt service burden, thus 
increasing the attractiveness of default. In general one could thus write:  
(32)    =  (∆ ( )) for ∆  ≡     −     > 0 and with 0<π(.)<1, π’>0, 
If this relationship is recognised in the determination of the risk premium, it implies that 
there is a feedback loop between a higher risk premium and a higher probability of default, 
which can be made explicit by substituting the determinants of the probability of default (32) 
into the market equilibrium condition (31).  
(33)    =
 
    (∆ ( ))
   
(     ) 
=
     
          ∆ ( ) )  
One can now envisage that a consistent equilibrium is established in a tâtonnement process: 
The right hand side of this equation can be viewed as the risk premium investors would 
require if the initial attempt to find equilibrium were equal to the left-hand side. Equilibrium A SIMPLE MODEL OF MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND DEFAULT | 13 
 
can be obtained only when the two are equal. As long as the risk premium required by 
investors is higher than the left-hand side the auctioneer would have to increase the rate.  
Given that the range for the risk premium is given by [1, αD] (with the restriction αD<1), it is 
sufficient to start by comparing the two extreme values of the risk premium to establish that 
an interior equilibrium exists at which default is neither ruled out nor certain.  
The lowest possible value for r is 1. At this value the right-hand side of equation (33) will 
clearly be greater than 1 as long as the probability of default is not strictly zero, even if the 
country does not have to pay a risk premium.  
(34) 
 
    (∆ (   ))
  
(    ) 
< 1 
This  implies  immediately  that  r=1  does  not  constitute  a  consistent  equilibrium  as  the 
investors  will  require  some  risk  premium,  however  small,  to  be  compensated  for  the 
probability, even if remote, that a default might occur. A model-consistent equilibrium will 
then require r>1. 
Figure 3 below illustrates this case. In this figure the right-hand side of equation (33) has 
been drawn in such a way that the probability of default goes to 1 only as r goes towards 
infinity and the probability of default goes to zero only as r also goes to zero (r= zero would 
mean zero debt service).  
 
Figure 3. Single equilibrium under uncertainty 
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The largest possible value for r is equal to r=(1-αD)-1 (if default is certain). However, in this 
case the right-hand side of equation (31) is smaller than this value as long as the probability 
of a default is strictly less than 1 even if r=(1-αD)-1. This can be seen by substituting r=(1-αD)-
1 into equation (33) and simplifying: 
(35)    =
 
    (∆ (   /(    )))
  
(    )
(    /(    )) 
=
 
[   (∆ (   /(    )))  ] <
 
     
The  risk  premium  associated  with  certain  default  (r=(1-αD)-1)  cannot  thus  constitute  an 
equilibrium. Again, see Figure 3 for an illustration.  
Taken together these two conditions imply that the equilibrium risk premium would have to 
lie between the two extremes r=1and r=(1-αD)-1. 
These  considerations  imply  that  some  general  properties  of  the  equilibrium  can  be 
established without determining the details of the link between the probability of default and 
the social loss.  
A  first  result  is  that  uncertainty  reduces  the  range  of  the  equilibria  possible  if  default 
becomes certain or impossible only outside the limiting values of the risk premium under 
certainty.  Secondly,  the  potential  for  multiple  equilibria  is  reduced  with  their  existence 
becoming more unlikely the more uncertainty there is, i.e. if a higher debt level (and/or cost 
of levying taxes) does not lead to a stepwise increase in the probability of default. 
A higher debt level, or a higher cost of levying taxes, will in general increase the probability 
that the default option is chosen (the right-hand side of equation (33) is increasing in αD). 
Thus leading to higher risk premia. 
Whether or not there is still potential for multiple equilibria under uncertainty depends on 
how a higher loss influences the probability of default.  
Figure 4 shows the case for three equilibria. The middle (Q2) one is not locally stable in the 
sense that setting a higher risk premium leads to an even higher premium by investors (and 
vice versa), but the two outer ones (Q1 and Q3) are locally stable. However, their range is 
clearly smaller than the range one would obtain under certainty. Moreover, given that they 
are locally stable it would take a very large shock to shift from one equilibrium to another. 
For example, if new information about the debt level shifts the curve determining the market 
interest rate (right hand side of equation (32)) upwards, the economy might enter the region 
of multiple equilibria (e.g. if the curve shifts from the one depicted in Figure 3 to the one 
depicted in Figure 4). But in this case the interest rate should increase gradually and the Q1 
equilibrium should persist unless a very large shock affects the market. Under certainty, by 
contrast, which of the two ‘sunspot’ equilibria will come about is totally indeterminate.  
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Figure 4. Multiple equilibria under uncertainty 
 
 
It is worth emphasising that the probability of default that determines the risk premium is 
the probability as perceived by investors. In a world of efficient markets this should be equal 
to the objective probability, i.e. ex post the probability that the country actually chooses to 
default (given the market interest) is equal to the one expected by the market. For those who 
believe that investors make systematic mistakes it would of course be possible to make a 
different assumption. 
The main insight from this section is that, ceteris paribus, a higher subjective expectation of 
default increases of course the market interest rate and the likelihood that multiple equilibria 
become possible. But the increase in the interest rate should be gradual, and it remains the 
case that the equilibrium with the lowest (and the highest) interest rate should be locally 
stable. 
4.  Modelling uncertainty explicitly: An illustration 
The  continued  existence  of  multiple  equilibria  under  uncertainty  depends  on  the  precise 
nature of the stochastic factors that affect the decision to default.  
One  intuitive  and  appealing  way  to  think  about  the  lack  of  automaticity  in  the  default 
decision is that different parties (and different interest groups) might have different views on 
the lump-sum cost of default. Which party will win the election cannot be determined with 
certainty ex ante, but whichever party wins it is clear that the ‘temptation’ to default will be 
greater the greater the social loss that can be avoided by defaulting.  
It  thus  seems  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  probability  of  the  government  choosing  to 
default increases with the size of the difference between the social loss under default and the 
loss if debt is serviced in full. One way to formalise this is to think about different parties 
having  different  evaluations  of  the  lump-sum  cost  of  defaulting,  denoted  by  LLd  under 
certainty. Which party wins is a random process since parties compete not only on this issue, 16 |  DANIEL GROS 
 
but also on many others. One can then order all parties by their own (subjective) view on LLd. 
Given the level of debt, the cost of levying taxes and the interest rate fixed in the market one 
can then calculate the ‘temptation’ to default, i.e. the welfare gain from imposing a haircut on 
creditors and thus lowering the tax burden. If the party that comes to power has a subjective 
view of the lump-sum cost of defaulting as being smaller than this temptation it will default 
– and vice versa. 
It  follows  that  the  probability  of  default  will  be  given  by  the  value  of  the  cumulative 
distribution  function  of  the  views  on  LLd  over  all  parties  (or  voters)  up  to  the  point  of 
temptation. 
This  function  must  have  the  following  characteristics:  it  must  be  strictly  increasing  over 
positive values of the LLd and it must be bounded by zero (in the vicinity of zero for LLd) and 
one (for LLd going to infinity). A computational convenient functional form would be the 
following: 
(36)    =
          
 
            
  = 1 −
 
      (    (   )  )   = 1 −
 
       < 1 β>0 
With the composite parameter θ(α) defined as: 
(37)    ≡  (  (1 +  )  )
   
The parameter β indicates the form of the distribution of the views of the lump-sum cost of 
default over all parties, and thus the sensitivity of the probability of default to the welfare 
loss from paying in full (compared to the default option). If β is close to zero, the probability 
of default will always remain close to zero because the views of most parties/voters imply a 
very high value for LLd. By contrast a very high value of β represents a situation in which 
most parties hold the view that the lump-sum cost of default is low, which implies that the 
probability of default will be high (unless there is either no debt or the cost of levying taxes is 
zero (D or α = 0)). 
The functional form for the probability of default in equation (36) implies that the median 
LLd (i.e. where the probability of default is equal to one half) is given by LLd, median= rDβθ. 
Looking at it from the point of view of the risk premium that will lead to a probability of 
default equal to one-half, this can be restated as: rπ=0.5= LLd, median/Dβθ. Naturally, the higher 
the debt level the higher the median cost of default must be to maintain the risk premium at 
the same level. 
The determinant of the probability of default can now be substituted back into the equation 
describing the market equilibrium (33). 
(38)    =
(     )
 (     )  (∆ ( ))     
(39)    (1 +    )−  (∆ ( ))     = (1 +    ) 
(40)      [1 −  (∆ ( ))] +  (1 −   ) − 1 = 0 
Substituting for the value of the probability of default as a function of the risk premium and 
the other parameters of the models yields: 
(41)        
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This can be simplified to a quadratic expression in the risk premium, r. 
(42)       + [ (1 −   ) − 1][1 +     ] = 0 
(43)    [   + (1 −   )   ] +  [(1 −   ) −    ]− 1 = 0 
This expression has clearly only one solution for r in the positive quadrant. This implies that 
if the probability of default depends on the risk premium in the way specified in equation 
(36), only one equilibrium exists (whatever the values of all the parameters of the model). It 
follows  that  under  uncertainty  the  potential  for  multiple  equilibria  can  disappear  for  an 
entire class of the specification that links the temptation to default to the probability of it 
actually happening. 
5.  Concluding remarks 
This paper explores a simple set-up with costs of default, which implies that under certain 
conditions it might make sense for creditors to forgive part of a country’s debt to avoid it 
choosing to default and thereby paying even less. The simple model presented here also 
shows that a potential for multiple equilibria can arise. 
The  framework  is useful  in  analysing  the  problems  in  the  euro  area  where  governments 
cannot rely on a central bank to be the buyer-of-last-resort of their debt. Kopf (2011) and De 
Grauwe (2011) argue that this opens up the potential for multiple equilibria or ‘speculative 
attacks’.   
But the model also implies that under the more realistic case of uncertainty the potential for 
multiple  equilibria  should  be  smaller;  and  that  it  might  actually  disappear  altogether, 
depending on the link between expectations of default and some key characteristics of the 
economy.  
Considering the role of uncertainty is essential if models of multiple equilibria are to be used 
to analyse real world problems, since in reality the decision of a state to default is always 
preceded by a period of heightened uncertainty during which different groups within the 
country express widely different positions. The results found here would suggest that the 
importance of multiple (or sun-spot) equilibria might be overestimated in the crisis affecting 
the euro area at present. 
An underlying assumption in the analysis presented here is that expectations are consistent 
with the model. It should also be possible to address the consequences of ‘irrational’ market 
conditions. Under uncertainty the market rate is determined by the subjective probabilities 
as perceived by investors. To the extent that these market expectations are higher than the 
objective ones (i.e. taking into account only the factors driving the decision to default), the 
risk  premium  would  be  higher  than  one  would  expect  from  the  fundamentals  alone.  A 
‘panic’ could lead to higher interest rates and possibly increase the parameter range over 
which multiple equilibria are possible. This might be a useful avenue for future research. 
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